MEET MR./MS. TERRORIST
by B.Raman
If one excludes instances of terrorism indulged in by
psychopaths and criminals, terrorism, in its simplest definition, is the
attempt to use terror or the use of terror by an individual or a group or
an organisation, which could be even a State, to achieve an objective,
which is normally at least partly political.
Whatever be the categorisation of the group or
organisation indulging in terrorism, it has certain common
characteristics:
* Firstly, there is an objective and a passionate belief
in the rightness of the objective and a strong conviction that the use
of terror for achieving that objective is justified.
* Secondly, there is a sincerity, which borders on
fanaticism and a willingness to sacrifice one's life for achieving the
objective. Behind most terrorist actions, there is a powerful,
passionate conviction in the rightness of their cause and in the
justifiability of the means used by them in the interest of their cause.
* Thirdly, there is an anger, an anger which is the
product of not an unthinking mind, but of a mind, which is intelligent,
sometimes even highly educated, resourceful and analytical; an anger
which is directed against the individual or individuals, community,
society or State, which is perceived by that mind as its principal
adversary, whose will has to be overcome for achieving its objective.
* Fourthly, there is a tremendous will, which is
fearsome; a will to succeed by prevailing over the will of its
adversary. It is a will, which is ruthless, which admits of no
restraints or rules and which makes no distinction between different
sections of its targeted victims. It makes no distinction between
the Security Forces and innocent civilians, between the aged and the
young, between women and children. It is a will which has been
rendered insensitive by its passionate urge to achieve its objective and
hence is indifferent to the hardships and sufferings, which it causes
even to the people for whose cause it claims to be fighting. It is
indifferent to how the society perceives its actions.
QUALITIES WHICH ONE FINDS IN A TERRORIST LEADER
An analysis of many terrorist leaders of the world would
indicate that they shared certain common qualities:
* Firstly, most of them were not extroverts. They
were not given to bombast, whether in word or action. In their
private lives, many of them were almost soft-spoken and even
gentle. They were careful in speech and action.
* Secondly, they had a mind, which was intelligent,
alert, razor-sharp and well-ordered. Lucidity in the analysis of
the prevailing operational environment, meticulousness in planning their
operations and shrewdness in having them executed characterised their
actions.
* Thirdly, they had a mind which was sophisticated,
with a tremendous capacity to absorb. Many of them were highly
educated. Practically all of them, whether well-educated or not,
showed an ability to understand and master the weapons of death, whether
it be the rifle or the hand-grenade, the rocket-launcher or the
improvised explosive device or a widebodied aircraft filled with fuel
and a dexterity in having them carried to the scene of their operations
without being detected by the Security Forces and in having them used
with devastating effect.
* Fourthly, they had very quick reflexes and a
remarkable ability to keep one step ahead of the intelligence agencies
and the Security Forces of the adversary.
* Fifthly, they were men/women of great charisma,
which they carried lightly on their shoulders and had the capacity to
have part of it transferred to their followers. They managed to
create in each and everyone of their followers a feeling as if he or she
had been specially hand-picked by them and as if he or she was the most
trusted by them. They showed a readiness to share with their
followers credit for successful operations just as they showed a
readiness to share with them the blame for failures. They were not
given to credit-grabbing or buck-passing.
* Sixthly and finally, they were persons of great care
and caution. They never embarked on an operation and never sent
their followers on any major operation unless and until they were
convinced that objective conditions for its success existed. It is
said that behind every successful operation of Carlos, there were at
least half a dozen, if not more, aborted attempts, which were called off
by him because he felt that such objective conditions were not
there. Whenever Carlos felt that the risks to which he was
exposing his followers were more than normal, he himself participated in
the operation in order to share the risks with them. An example of
this was the personal participation of Carlos in the kidnapping of the
OPEC Oil Ministers at Vienna in December 1975.
QUALITIES WHICH ONE FINDS IN MOST TERRORISTS
What qualities a terrorist leader looks for while
selecting his followers for an operation? It is difficult to give a
categorical answer to this question, but there are certain qualities which
one can discern in most terrorists who form part of the hard-core of
terrorist organisations, as distinguished from the peripheral elements,
who play mostly a supportive role:
* Firstly, they believe passionately in the justness of
their cause. This is the most important quality, since this is the
most important motivating factor of all their actions.
* Secondly, the killer instinct; a readiness to kill,
not in anger, not in the heat of the moment, not during a fight or a
battle, but in cold blood, without any qualms of conscience or feelings
of pity or remorse.
* Thirdly, an ability to act a loner, if circumstances
so warrant, even though in their private lives they may not be
loners. Members of conventional armies and insurgent and guerilla
organisations train, live and move together and normally operate in
groups, though there may be circumstances when individual members may
have to operate alone. On the contrary, in the case of terrorist
organisations, , they may train and occasionally live together, but,
more often than not, their members operate as loners, unless they are
engaged in operations such as the hijacking of an aircraft or
kidnapping. About 60 per cent of the terrorist incidents reported
every year are operations in which the terrorists operate as
loners---assassinations of individuals, sniper firing, throwing of hand
grenades, planting of explosives etc. To be thus able to operate
as a loner requires even greater physical courage and determination than
operating in groups. It requires even greater dedication and
loyalty than while operating in groups.
* Fourthly, a very high degree of physical courage
because a terrorist risks not only death, but even worse than death,
physical torture if he is caught.
CHARACTERISATION OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS
Terrorist organisations can be broadly divided into the
following categories:
* Those whose objective is ideological and which are
class-oriented and not community or religion oriented. Such
organisations generally have a narrow popular base and draw most of
their leadership from the educated urban middle class and upper middle
class and tend to be elitist.
* Those who have the "the national liberation of
their homeland" as their political objective. These are
community and not class oriented and enjoy at least some measure of
support, either expressed or silent, in the community from which they
have arisen. In contrast to the ideologically-oriented
organisations, they are not generally elitist , have a much smaller
percentage of highly-educated elements and intellectuals amongst their
leadership and draw their following from a much broader strata of
society, urban as well as rural. Whereas in the case of
ideologically-oriented terrorist organisations, the leadership and
members come from middle class and upper middle class families and
economic hardship and unemployment are not factors which drive them to
terrorism, in the case of terrorist organisations aiming for national
liberation, economic hardship and unemployment are often important
factors in adding to the recruitment.
* Terrorist organisations, which are religion or sect
oriented and come into being because of perceived grievances due to
religious or sectarian causes. Like the terrorist organisations of the
national liberation kind, they enjoy greater public support than the
ideologically-oriented groups and draw their following from a much
broader strata of society, urban as well as rural. Again, they have a
much smaller inflow of intellectuals into their organisations and tend
to be less elitist in character.
* Terrorist organisations which are anarchist or
issue-based such as those fighting for the protection of environment
etc. Like the ideologically-oriented groups, they are largely
urban-focussed and elitist, draw their leadership and following from
well-to-do families and have a large intake of intellectuals.
While Governments confronted with terrorist
organisations of a class-oriented or issue-based or anarchist nature often
succeed in bringing them under control, if not in totally eliminating
them, by taking advantage of their lack of public support, Governments
confronted with terrorist organisations, which are community or religion
oriented, have difficulty in controlling them.
An important reason for this is the ambivalence of the
community or the religious group from which these organisations have
arisen. While the majority may not support the use of terror by
these organisations to achieve their aims, their shared perception of
their grievances, of the nature of the ruling power or administration and
of their relationship with what they look upon as the adversary community
or religious group make them, hesitant or unwilling, to back the ruling
administration in its counter-terrorism operations. Another reason for
their ambivalence is, of course, intimidation.
All terrorist organisations having national liberation
as their objective adopt political as well as terroristic methods in
tandem, with the political and the terrorist wings kept separate at least
overtly. While the political wing aims to create an awareness of and
sympathy for the political objective of the organisation by highlighting
the human rights aspects of the problem, the terrorist wing acts as the
cutting edge to make the ruling power or administration realise that it
has no other alternative but to concede their demands.
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
Like conventional Security Forces, insurgent and
guerilla groups too follow the hierarchial structure. Terrorist
groups, on the other hand, have either an exclusively centrifugal
structure with the leader like the Godfather in a mafia organisation in
the centre and the others around him in various concentric circles, or a
mix of the hierarchial and the centrifugal. They avoid an
exclusively hierarchial structure. A centrifugal set-up builds a
closely knit relationship of personalised loyalty to each other and to the
leader and dedication to the cause. There is a greater tactical
flexibility with the scattered members being able to take advantage of
targets of opportunity without the members every time having to go to a
hierarchial superior for orders.
The relative absence of conflicting ambitions and
jealousies in a centrifugal organisation makes it much more difficult for
the intelligence agencies to penetrate it than in the case of hierarchial
organisations. Moreover, a centrifugal organisation, with its
absence of domination by one absolute figure, is generally less amenable
to a political compromise or a dialogue than a hierarchial set-up.
Because of their reluctance to compromise, they would rather face
destruction or disintegration at the hands of the Security Forces rather
than dilute their ultimate objective.
COUNTER-TERRORISM
It is said that terrorism makes Hamlets of
decision-makers. It poses more questions than it provides
answers. How to deal with it? The soft option? The hard option?
Administrative measures? Political measures? Political dialogue? If so,
when and with whom? Firmness? Concessions? There are no copybook answers
to these questions because there is no copybook method of dealing with
terrorism. Everyone confronted with the menace has to learn from
experience, the hard way.
However, certain observations have universal validity:
* Very few countries in the world have succeeded in
ending terrorism through purely security measures.
* There has, therefore, to be a mix of security and
political measures, but because of their centrifugal nature, terrorist
organisations tend to be impervious to political approaches.
* The approach has, therefore, to be directed not to
the organisation, but to the community from which the organisation has
arisen.
* The community is generally reluctant to respond to
such political approaches even if attracted by them because of
intimidation and the ambiance of terror created by the terrorists.
* Thus, we come back to the beginning of the vicious
circle ---how to deal with this ambiance of terror and free the
population from its hold?
In counter-terrorism operations, effective protective
measures are the sine qao non of success. Make it impossible for the
terrorist to hijack or blow up a plane or to kidnap an individual.
If despite all security measures he succeeds, stand firm and refuse to
concede his demand. Make it difficult for him to operate as a
loner. Deny him the aura of martyrdom by avoiding over-reaction in
dealing with him. Deny him new recruits by winning over the population and
by being receptive to their grievances. Deny him funds and weapons
by choking his financial sources. Deny him the theatre which he
needs for publicising his actions. If all this is done in an
effective and sustained manner, his organisation will start withering
away.
To make the terrorist organisation wither away, that
should be the objective of any counter-terrorism operation.
However, where any terrorist movement is
externally-directed by a State-sponsor of terrorism for achieving its
strategic objective through the use of terrorism, the victim State has to
exercise the right of active defence against that State, clandestinely
making it bleed till it stops its sponsorship. The exercise of the
right of active defence has to assume priority.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Government of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com
)
